We develop a theory of outsourcing in which there is market power in one factor market (labor) and no market power in a second factor market (capital). There are two intermediate goods: one labor-intensive and the other capital-intensive. We show there is always outsourcing in the market allocation when a friction limiting outsourcing is not too big. The key factor underlying the result is that labor demand is more elastic, the greater the labor share. Integrated plants pay higher wages than the specialist producers of labor-intensive intermediates. We derive conditions under which there are multiple equilibria that vary in the degree of outsourcing. Across these equilibria, wages are lower the greater the degree of outsourcing. Wages fall when outsourcing increases in response to a decline in the outsourcing friction.
Introduction
In the 1920s, Henry Ford famously built a factory in which the raw materials for steel went in on one end and finished automobiles went out the other. Extreme vertical integration like this is not the fashion today. Ford Motor has in recent years spun off a significant portion of its parts-making operations as a separate company, and General Motors has done the same. Within its assembly plants, General Motors is currently trying to outsource janitorial services and forklift operations to outside contractors. This paper develops a theory of outsourcing in which the circumstances under which factors of production can grab rents play the leading role. One factor has some monopoly power (call this labor) while a second factor does not (call this capital). There are two stages of production: a labor-intensive task and a capital-intensive task. For example, auto part production (such as hand soldering of wire harnesses) tends to be labor-intensive, while final assembly of automobiles (with robots and huge machines) tends to be capital-intensive. In the model, all firms have the same abilities, so there is no motivation to specialize to exploit Ricardian comparative advantage. Furthermore, an outsourcing friction is incurred when the two tasks are not integrated in the same firm. So, in the absence of any monopoly power by labor, all firms are completely integrated, doing the labor-intensive and capital-intensive tasks as part of the same operation, and the outsourcing friction is avoided. However, if labor has monopoly power and if the friction is not too large, outsourcing necessarily takes place, with some firms specializing in the labor-intensive task and other firms specializing in the capital-intensive task.
The mechanism underlying our outsourcing result is simply that labor demand is more elastic, the greater the labor share of a firm's overall factor bill. In particular, the demand of an integrated firm is less elastic than the demand of a specialist labor-intensive producer, such as a janitorial services provider. Therefore, a monopolist selling labor to a labor-intensive firm will choose a lower wage than one selling to an integrated plant. This wage difference is the force driving the disintegration of production of the high and low labor-intensity tasks.
(But note the wage of a specialist capital-intensive plant is higher than for an integrated plant. This is a subtlety we return to below.)
The main question that we address with the model is: How are changes in outsourcing related to changes in wage payments in general equilibrium? Our unambiguous finding is that increases in outsourcing go hand in hand with decreases in wage payments. Our result allows for two forces underlying an increase in outsourcing. The first force is a decrease over time in the outsourcing friction. A recent series of papers, including Antràs, Garicano, and RossiHansberg (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) , have emphasized the advances in information and transportation technology that have permitted the separation of tasks previously required to be part of the same operation. When components are manufactured by separate operations, information costs must be incurred to ensure that separately produced components fit together both physically and in a timely production schedule (such as in just-in-time production). Japanese automobile manufacturers pioneered new ways to coordinate production with suppliers (see Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) and Mair, Florida, and Kenney (1988) ), and these methods have been adopted by U.S. manufacturers. This is an example of a decrease in the outsourcing friction. In recent years, there have been innovations in organizational forms and administrative structures, such as professional employer organizations that facilitate the segmentation of factors of production across different firm boundary lines. We broadly interpret these innovations as decreases in the friction.
The second force potentially underlying an increase in outsourcing is a positive feedback between lower wages and more outsourcing. This makes it possible to observe different outcomes over time, even when technological fundamentals do not change. That is, for certain parameters in our model, there can be multiple equilibria with different levels of outsourcing.
When this happens, we show the equilibria can be ordered so that more outsourcing is associated with lower average wages. Put in another way, an increase in outsourcing can depress wages in general equilibrium which, in turn, can change incentives so that firms want to do more outsourcing, making the original increase in outsourcing self-reinforcing.
We find that the possibility of multiple equilibria is contingent on an assumption that rentseeking activity (for union rents) absorbs a portion of the labor supply, putting upward pressure on wages. Our finding that for the same model parameters both an outsourcing and a vertical integration equilibrium might exist is reminiscent of a finding by McLaren (2000) . But the mechanism and context are completely different here.
A premise of this paper is that labor has market power while capital does not. There are good reasons to accept this premise. Workers can go on strike, and various job market protections in labor law can enhance labor bargaining power. Perhaps there will come a day when robots go on strike, but for now, business managers need not worry about capital walking off the job. In the formal analysis, we model market power narrowly as taking the form of a union with a monopoly on labor at the plant level. Our idea applies more broadly to include other sources of market power for workers, including job search frictions and potentially even social norms. Finally, while we call factor one labor and factor two capital, we can just as easily think of factor one as unionized unskilled labor and factor two as nonunion skilled labor.
Whether to integrate or outsource-the "make or buy" decision-is a classic topic in the theory of the firm. Much of the literature has focused on the role of incomplete contracts (Williamson (1979) , Grossman and Hart (1986) ).
1 In these models, economic agents cannot contractually commit to future behavior. Firm boundaries are drawn to optimally influence incentives, given the constraints of incomplete contracts. This kind of timing and commitment issue arises in our model. We make a crucial assumption that firms make long-run decisions about integration status before they engage in wage negotiations; the anticipation of lower wages on the labor-intensive task is precisely what induces firms to outsource. While our paper follows this literature in that timing and commitment play a key role, the model we consider is very different from those in the existing literature. This is especially true in the way we highlight and incorporate differences in factor composition across tasks Also, the main question we address, How does outsourcing impact wages in general equilibrium? is different from the standard topic in the incomplete contracts literature, which is: When and how does outsourcing occur?
In its general equilibrium approach and its focus on what happens when trade frictions decline, the paper is close in spirit to the trade literature on offshoring (e.g., Grossman and Helpman (2005) , Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) ) and assignment theories of foreign direct investment (FDI) about who should specialize in which task (Nocke and Yeaple (2008) ). 2 Our paper is particularly related to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) .
That paper highlights how a reduction in an outsourcing friction can potentially raise lowskill wages in a high-skill country through what they call a productivity effect. This effect operates through a fixed amount of outsourcing proceeding more efficiently on account of the technical change. This channel operates in our model as well. Fixing the extent of outsourcing at some positive level, a reduction in the outsourcing friction raises wages as workers share the benefit of technological improvements. The negative impact on wages from technical change in our model comes entirely from its impact on increasing the extent of outsourcing.
The tensions that exist in our model are related to issues that arise in the analysis of price discrimination. With integration, there is a uniform wage for labor. With outsourcing, there is one wage for workers who do the labor-intensive task and a second, higher wage for workers who do the capital-intensive task. The uniform wage under outsourcing lies between the two task-specific, discriminatory wages. In the standard decision-theoretic analysis of monopoly price discrimination, a monopolist is always better off when price discrimination is feasible.
However, as shown in Holmes (1989) and Corts (1998) , the ability to price discriminate in a competitive context can potentially reduce equilibrium returns to price discriminators.
In an analogous way, unions in our model are worse off in equilibrium when workers doing different tasks receive different wages because of outsourcing. As noted parenthetically above, wage levels and total wage payments to workers doing the capital-intensive task actually do increase with outsourcing compared to integration. But we show that these gains are more than offset by losses suffered by workers doing the labor-intensive task.
Existing empirical research provides evidence that wage reductions play a role in motivating outsourcing decisions. The building service industry (i.e., janitorial services) is obviously a labor-intensive industry. Abraham (1990) and Dube and Kaplan (2008) show that building service employees employed in the business service sector (e.g., contract cleaning firms)
receive substantially lower wages and benefits than employees doing the same jobs and with similar characteristics employed by manufacturing firms. And Abraham and Taylor (1996) show that it is the higher-wage firms that are more likely to contract out cleaning services.
Forbes and Lederman (forthcoming) discuss how airlines spin off short routes to regional airlines because the pilots of these airlines are then less able to extract rents. This fits our model if short routes with small planes are less capital intensive than long-haul routes with large planes. Doellgast and Greer (2007) provide a case study of the German automobile industry to show how outsourcing parts has cut rents. We do not know of such a study for the U.S. automobile industry, but as mentioned in the first paragraph, there is anecdotal evidence that the same has happened in the United States. More specifically, General
Motors (GM) spun off Delphi, its labor-intensive parts operations, and subsequently Delphi is trying to cut wages "to as little as $10 an hour from as much as $30." 3 GM spun off the parts operation American Axle in 1992, and subsequently American Axle succeeded in cutting wages by about a third. 4 As part of the plan to outsource janitorial services at GM assembly plants, the expectation is that wages to janitors would fall from $28 an hour for an in-house GM employee to around $12 an hour for an employee of a contract cleaning firm. 
Model
We describe the technology and then explain how unions operate. Next we explain timing in the model and define equilibrium.
The Technology
We model an industry in which a final good is made out of two intermediates. The first A firm may be vertically integrated, producing both intermediates and combining them on its premises. Or it can be specialized in the production of a particular intermediate good.
The final good results from combining the two intermediates according to a fixed-proportions technology. If the two inputs  1 and  2 are produced in a vertically integrated firm, then final good output equals
If the inputs are produced by two specialists, then final good output is
The parameter  ≥ 0 is the outsourcing friction that must be incurred when the two steps of production are undertaken by two different firms.
To illustrate the friction  , suppose that if the two steps are undertaken by separate firms, the intermediates need to be wrapped in certain protective packaging before being shipped off to final assembly. An integrated plant making both intermediates and combining them on premises can avoid the packaging process. In this illustrative case,  represents the physical cost of wrapping and unwrapping the intermediates as well as the cost of the packing materials. In addition to physical costs like these, as discussed in the introduction we interpret  broadly as representing costs of coordinating production. Recent advances in information and transportation technology have substantially lowered such costs; i.e.,  has decreased.
The three factors of production in the economy are: managers, labor, and capital. There is a unit measure of managers who each own one firm. Given the one-to-one relationship, for simplicity, will refer to the combination of one manager and one firm as a "firm." There is a measure of labor that is supplied inelastically to the economy. There is a perfectly elastic supply of capital to the economy at a rental price of  per unit.
Each firm has access to the same technology for converting capital and labor into in-
denote an input vector for a particular firm, where   and   denote the amount of capital and labor the firm allocates to the production of intermediate
Given such an input vector, the production levels for each intermediate equal
where   is the composite input for intermediate i defined by
To understand this technology, observe that the   and   are first combined in a constantreturns Cobb-Douglas fashion through (3) to create a composite input   . Then  1 and  2 are run through (2) to determine the intermediate production levels  1 and  2 . This last step allows for diminishing marginal product where the level of curvature is governed by the 
To simplify calculations, we assume symmetry,
For some of the analysis, it is convenient to focus on the limiting case where  1 = 1 and 
A firm can choose one of three types of vertical structure. The first possibility is an intermediate 1 specialist. In this case, the firm sets  1  0 and  2 = 0, and the production levels from (2) reduce to 
By design, the vertical structure is indeterminate when factor markets are perfectly competitive and the outsourcing friction  is zero. To illustrate, consider the limiting case where 
Using (6), a vertically integrated plant doing both intermediates at half this level,
collects a profit of
Since this is the same as the profit  1 to being an intermediate 1 specialist, firms are indifferent to the choice of vertical structure. Once we add a positive outsourcing friction   0, obviously firms will strictly prefer to be vertically integrated. But again, we have presumed competitive factor markets. We will see that when we add monopoly power to the labor market, an incentive for outsourcing emerges that can potentially overcome a positive friction  .
Unions
Each firm has a union that acts as a monopolist over the supply of labor to the firm. The union at a particular firm buys labor on the open market at a competitive wage  • and resells it to the firm at wage , pocketing the difference  −  • . The firm then makes its input choices, taking  as given. This setup-where the union picks the wage and the firm picks the employment level-is called the "right-to-manage" model in the labor literature.
The union operates at the plant level rather than the economy level. So the union at firm  sets a wage that is specific to firm .
We assume that the existence of monopoly rents attracts resources, following a long tradition in the economics literature. (See Posner (1975) for an early treatment and Cole and Ohanian (2004) for a recent treatment.) That is, resources get dissipated through rent seeking behavior. Specifically, of the units of labor that are inelastically supplied to the economy, a portion   goes toward rent seeking and the remaining portion  • goes to the competitive spot market to work in production,
We assume there is some matching process between the unit measure of firms and measure   of rent seekers that operates in a fashion such that the union rents in the economy are divided equally (in expectation) across rent seekers. As an example matching process, suppose for simplicity there are a finite number of firms and a finite number of rent seekers.
Begin by taking one firm and randomly draw a rent seeker from the pool of   rent seekers to which to assign the monopoly. Next, take a second firm and again randomly assign it to a draw from the original pool of   rent seekers. That is, use a "sampling with replacement"
process. With this process, any one rent seeker might end up with zero, one, or two or more monopolies. Given our assumption of risk neutrality, the particulars of the distribution across rent seekers will not matter, only the mean number of monopolies per rent seeker.
In summary, the abstraction employed here captures two main elements. First, there is market power in the provision of the labor factor, but no analogous market power in the provision of capital. In the formal setup, the rents go to the union and the production workers receive the competitive wage. However, it is straightforward to reinterpret the structure so that the people doing the production work are also engaging in rent seeking, so that the actual wage received includes the competitive wage as well as a rent component. Second, rent seeking consumes labor resources. This can be best understood as workers engaging in search behavior to obtain union jobs. Finally, while we treat the rent-seeking assumption as our baseline case, we also determine what happens without the rent-seeking assumption.
Timing and Equilibrium
Timing is in three stages. In stage 1, each firm commits to its vertical structure choice:
intermediate 1 specialist, intermediate 2 specialist, or fully integrated. Let   be the share of firms choosing vertical structure  (with  = 1 or  = 2 for specialists and  =   for a vertically integrated producer). Also in stage 1, a measure   of workers choose to seek the position of labor monopolist available at each firm. In stage 2, the labor monopolist at each particular firm  sets the wage   for firm . In stage 3, inputs are procured and production takes place.
An equilibrium is a list
First, each firm's choice of vertical structure  ∈ {1 2  } must be optimal, taking as given how its choice  impacts its wage   and taking as given the output prices. Second, the return to directing a unit of labor to the competitive spot market must equal the return to rent seeking, that is,
where the right-hand-side term averages the aggregate union rent  over the   labor units that seek it. Third, the choice of wage offered by the union of a type  firm must maximize the union's profit, given the anticipated demand behavior of the firm. Fourth, each firm of type  chooses inputs to maximize profits. Fifth, there must be market clearing in the spot market for labor. Sixth, the intermediate prices  1 and  2 faced by specialist producers must satisfy the arbitrage condition,
since combining one unit of each of the specialist produced goods yields 1 −  units of final good.
outsourcing.
How Union Wages and Production Costs Vary with Vertical Structure
It turns out that it is possible to derive optimal union wages without taking into account equilibrium conditions in the output markets. This subsection derives the optimal union wages and determines how production costs depend upon vertical structure.
We begin with an analysis of an intermediate 1 specialist. Suppose we are at stage 3 and an intermediate 1 specialist faces a wage of  1 . To study the firm's choice problem, it is useful to first determine the cost function of constructing  1 units of the composite input.
Given the constant returns Cobb-Douglas production function (3), it is a standard result that the cost function equals
(Since we are setting the rental rate on capital as the numeraire,  = 1, the term  1− that would normally appear drops out.) Furthermore, the cost-minimizing labor input choice is
From (5), a specialist producer with composite input level  1 produces   1 units of intermediate 1. Hence, profit at composite input  1 equals
( 1 1 ) Setting  1 to maximize profit yields the optimal choice of composite input  1
Plugging this into (10) yields the firm's labor demand
with constant elasticity
A key point is that elasticity depends on the labor share coefficient  1 . The higher  1 , the more elastic the labor demand.
With firm behavior at stage 3 pinned down, we go backward and examine the problem of the labor monopolist in stage 2 picking  1 . The labor monopolist obtains labor at the open-market rate  • and posts a wage  1 to maximize the union rent
Note that the monopoly operates at the firm level, not the economy level. If the monopoly were at the economy level, it would take into account the general equilibrium impact of the posted wage. By operating at the firm level, the labor monopolist takes output prices and the open-market wage  • as fixed. Since labor demand is constant elasticity, the rent-maximizing wage satisfies the standard monopoly markup over marginal cost condition
The analysis for an intermediate 2 specialist is the same as above with a change in subscripts. Since  2   1 , labor demand for an intermediate 2 firm is less elastic than for an intermediate 1 firm,  2   1 , and the wage is greater,  2   1 .
We turn next to the case of a vertically integrated firm. Given the fixed coefficient technology for the final good, an integrated firm produces an equal amount of both intermediate inputs. Let    be the composite input level of each intermediate. Given , the cost of producing both intermediates at this level is
Using the production function of the vertically integrated firm given by (6), we can write profit as
( 1 8 ) From (10), the firm's labor demand added up over both intermediate goods equals
Maximizing (18) with respect to the choice of  and then plugging  into (19) yields the labor demand function faced by the union,
The union picks  to maximize
Let    solve this problem. In general, no analytic solution exists. However, we can obtain an expression for the limiting case where  1 goes to 1 and  2 goes to zero,
By way of comparison, the wages set to specialist firms from (15) at this limit are
This follows because the elasticity for a specialist producing intermediate 1 goes to 1 1− while it goes to 1 for intermediate 2.
A key result that plays an important role in the subsequent analysis is that the total cost of constructing a composite input for each intermediate is less under specialization than under vertical integration. Let    and   be the cost of producing one unit of composite input  in the vertically integrated and specialist cases. Note that if  1 =  2 = 1 2 , the two intermediates are the same in elasticity, and there is no difference between the specialization structure and vertical integration in terms of union wage setting behavior; i.e.,    =   .
But when
, there is a difference. We begin with an analytic result at the limit where  1 goes to one. Let    =  1  +  2  be the combined cost to the vertically integrated firm of one unit of each composite input.
Proof. In the appendix we show that
which immediately implies the result. ¥ One thing to note about the limit for an intermediate 2 specialist is that even though the wage is going to infinity, the spending share on labor is going to zero. In the limit, the intermediate 2 specialist needs only to worry about expenditures on capital. At the limit, it requires one unit of capital to make one composite input. Since  = 1, it follows that
Understanding the limit where intermediate 1 is pure labor and intermediate 2 pure capital is easy. The demand for labor by a vertically integrated firm, for which labor represents only part of the factor bill, is obviously less elastic than for an intermediate 1 specialist, for which labor is the only input. So the union sets a higher wage to an integrated plant. By outsourcing the labor task, there is a clear savings in the wage bill, while the task using capital pays the market rate for capital either way.
Things are more subtle in the general case,  1),  ∈ (0 1), and  • (and  2 = 1 −  1 ), we find that Proof. Given an output price   and a unit composite input cost   of an intermediate  specialist, it is straightforward to derive its maximized profit,
( 2 3 ) Analogously, using (18), the profit of a vertically integrated union firm equals
If there is an equilibrium with specialization, both intermediate goods must be produced, and so firms must be indifferent between producing both, i.e.,  1 =  2 . By arbitrage, we
Using these two equations, we can solve out for  1 as
Plugging this into (23) and using straightforward algebra, a firm prefers specialization to integration if and only if
Recall from the previous section that  1 +  2     . Lemma A1 in the appendix shows that when  1 +  2     holds, (26) holds at  = 0. Define to be the unique  where (26) holds with equality. ¥ That outsourcing does not take place when  is large is obvious. What is interesting about Proposition 1 is that outsourcing necessarily does take place when the friction  is small but still positive. Recall that, in this environment, vertical structure would be indeterminate if both factor markets were competitive and if the friction  were zero. If factor markets were competitive and there were any positive friction, integration would necessarily prevail, as there is no technological benefit from specialization. But with monopoly in the labor market, there is an incentive to vertically disintegrate to limit rent extraction by the unions.
So specialization prevails if the outsourcing friction is small enough.
The shape of the relationship between the cutoff and the open-market wage  • plays a role in the subsequent analysis. We call this the " curve" and we plot it in Figure 1 for several different values of  1 ,  1 ∈ {06 08 1}, fixing  = 05. 9 We put the wage 
• on the vertical axis and on the horizontal, because this will be convenient later when  is exogenous and  • is endogenous. As illustrated, for a given value of  1 , there exists a
• min , and strictly increases in 
We can prove analytically that this property holds at  1 = 1, and we verify numerically that the property holds for general  1 .
10 Note that in the opposite limiting case
, vertical structure has no impact on wages, since both intermediates have the same labor intensity. In this extreme case, (
is the interesting case.
Outsourcing and Wage Decline
We now solve for equilibrium in the labor market and determine how both the open-market wage  • and the level of union rents vary with the outsourcing friction  .
It is convenient to split up the analysis. First, we impose an artificial restriction that vertical integration is infeasible so all firms must be specialists and determine what the equilibrium would look like in this case. Next, we flip the restriction so only integration is feasible. In the end, we allow both to be feasible and determine what happens.
Only Specialization
This subsection determines equilibrium when integration is not an option. We solve for how the demand for labor depends upon a given  • and then solve for market clearing.
Given  • and the associated union markups over
be the prices that equate the profit of an intermediate 1 specialist with an intermediate 2 specialist (see (25)) and that solve the arbitrage condition
the derived demand for labor for specialist  taking into account the impact of  • on price.
That is, using (13), i.e.,
since the left and right sides are the total productions of intermediates 1 and 2 and these must be equalized because of fixed coefficients. Using  1 = 1 −  2 , we havẽ
.
Putting all of this together, the total demand in the economy for production labor at an open-market wage  • across the two kinds of intermediates equals
where the subscript  signifies we are in the Only Specialization case.
We turn now to the labor allocated to rent seeking. When the open-market wage is  • , total union rents are
Plugging this into the equilibrium condition (7) that equalizes the return to rent seeking and  • , we can solve for the demand for rent-seeking labor,
Adding this to the demand for production labor yields the overall demand for labor in the
where we note the explicit dependence of demand on the outsourcing friction, as this is useful at this point. Market clearing requires that demand 
Proof. See appendix.¥
We use numerical methods to verify that the three properties listed hold for general  1 .
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The relationship  
Only Integration
Now consider the case where only vertical integration is feasible. Analogous to (27) above, we can construct labor demand 12 Beyond analytic results for the  1 = 1 case, we also confirm that the analog of Lemma 2 holds for general
. Parts (ii) and (iii) are analytically straightforward. We verify part (i) (that
• ) numerically using the same grid as in footnote 11.
A Key Step
The key step underlying our main result is what happens to labor demand at the boundary of indifference between specialization and integration. Our result is
. That is, labor demand in the only-specialization case is less than in the only-integration case.
Proof. See appendix.¥ As before, we use numerical analysis to verify that this result holds for general  1 .
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To shed some light on the mechanics of the result, we note that if we only look at the demand for production labor, there is an ambiguous relationship between the two cases, i.e.,
. But for rent-seeking labor, there is an unambiguous comparison. Rents are strictly lower in the  case compared to  , so fewer workers are attracted to rent seeking in the  case. This effect is large enough to more than offset any countervailing effect on the demand for production labor.
Putting It All Together
We now put this all together and completely characterize how the equilibrium in the economy depends upon the degree of outsourcing.
We start by defining a critical level for the exogenous labor supply,
curve intersects on the upward-sloping portion of (as in the small case in Figure 2 ).
When  min , 
• *  intersects on the downward-sloping portion (as in the large case). We next provide our formal characterization. On a first reading, it might be helpful to skip the formal statement and jump to the discussion below about the graphical illustration of the result. Subcase 1(iii) For  ∈ (  ), there is partial integration, 0      1. The wage is determined from the curve,
The share of firms that are vertically integrated is the unique    satisfying
and    strictly increases in  . Also, the equilibrium wage  • * ( ) strictly increases in  , so more outsourcing co-moves with lower wages. here where all firms are specialized because (1) being on the curve means firms are just as happy to be specialized as integrated and (2) being on the 
• *  curve means supply equals demand in the labor market. For  to the left of point , complete specialization is the only possibility, and we follow along the  • *  curve to pin down the wage. Notice that as  is decreased in this range, wages rise. This is an example of the productivity effect highlighted in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) . Over this region, all activity is outsourced, and the impact of reducing the friction  is that this given level of outsourcing takes place more efficiently. Some of the gain is passed along in terms of higher wages.
Next, notice point  where  • *  intersects the curve. Observe point  is at a higher wage than . This necessarily follows from Lemma 3. At point , if firms were to switch over to vertical integration from specialization (which they are indifferent to doing), total labor demand would increase. To get market clearing, the wage needs to increase, and that is what happens at point B. For  in between points  and , the wage is set on the curve to make firms indifferent to vertical structure. A fraction    are integrated, and this share is chosen to clear the labor market. The key thing to note is that as we move from  to  and lower the outsourcing friction, the extent of outsourcing increases at the same time that the wage falls. This is the main result of the paper. We have been focusing on the open-market wage, but we now turn to the average wage paid by firms. This is the wage bill added up across all firms divided by the number of production workers. It equals
which is the open-market wage plus the average union markup. Above we show that the open-market wage declines with outsourcing. Our next result shows that the mean firm wage also declines with outsourcing.
Proposition 3. Suppose  1 = 1,  2 = 0.
(i) Assume Case 1 where  ≤ min so there is a unique equilibrium. In the region of partial integration,  ∈ (  ), the mean firm wage is lower the lower is  .
(ii) Assume Case 2 where   min so there is a range of  ∈ (  ) with multiple equilibria. Across the multiple equilibria, less integration is associated with a lower mean firm wage.
Sketch of Proof. Calculations in the appendix show that 
• decreases with outsourcing.
Since  • goes down, both effects work together to lower the mean firm wage.¥
The Role of Rent Seeking
The above analysis assumes that rent seeking absorbs part of the labor supply according to the equilibrium condition (7). In this subsection, we consider an alternative formulation where the rents are distributed across workers, without absorbing labor resources.
It is straightforward to modify the equilibrium conditions for this alternative formulation. In particular, we need to change the definition of labor demand (27) to only include production labor labor rents. In the baseline model, the reduction in rents attracts less labor to outsourcing, leaving more labor for production and further depressing wages. It is possible for these lower wages to spur additional outsourcing, creating a positive feedback loop and reinforcing the original outsourcing at the start of the story. When the rent-seeking element is taken out, a piece of the loop is gone, and the equilibrium is now unique.
General Input Shares
Our formal results assume the limiting case  1 = 1,  2 = 0. We illustrate what happens for general  1  1,  2 = 1− 1 with numerical analysis of Case 1 (the small- case with a unique equilibrium). Fixing all of the parameters other than  , we determine  +   (the lowest  with complete vertical integration at point B in Figure 4 ) and  +  (the highest  with complete specialization at point A). We decrease the friction from  +   to  +  and determine how equilibrium variables change as the economy moves from complete integration to complete specialization. We report the results in Table 1 for both the baseline case with rent seeking and the non-rent-seeking case.
14 Panel A reports the limiting case of  1 = 1 that is covered in Propositions 3 and 4.
We know from these results that 
• and   both decrease as  decreases from  +   to  +  , and we can see this in the table. Note that wages are significantly higher in the rentseeking case because rent seeking absorbs labor driving up wages. We also report the total wage bill, total firm profits, and total surplus (the sum of firm profits plus the wage bill).
In terms of effects on total surplus, there are three considerations. First, the switch from integration to outsourcing weakens the labor monopoly, which reduces wasteful rent-seeking behavior. Second, firms' decisions are less distorted. Offsetting these positive impacts is a third consideration that outsourcing entails a friction (approximately 13 percent of output in Panel A) that is avoided with integration. In the rent-seeking case, the net effect of outsourcing on surplus is strictly positive.
15 With no rent seeking, the first consideration is eliminated, and the net effect on total surplus is negative; the cost of the friction outweighs the benefits of reduced distortions. Despite the friction, firms outsource because profits are higher.
The remaining panels in Table 1 , the effects become smaller and go to zero.
At this lower bound, there is no difference in factor intensity between the two intermediates and the incentive for outsourcing disappears ( goes to zero). One interesting thing in these remaining panels is what happens to the wage bill for intermediate 2, the capital-intensive task. This is positive in the remaining panels, since  2  0. Note that this wage bill strictly increases with outsourcing throughout all the cases. So from labor's perspective, the process of vertical disintegration has offsetting effects: the wage bill for intermediate 2 goes up, the wage bill for intermediate 1 goes down. The key finding of the paper is that the combined impact is negative.
Concluding Remarks
We have developed a new general equilibrium model of outsourcing and have put it to work analyzing the connection between outsourcing and wages. We believe this structure 14 Throughout the table,  = 5 and = 16 are held fixed. We have rescaled the total wage bill, profits, and total surplus by multiplying through by 100. 15 The net positive impact is negligible for  1 = 1 but is significant in the other cases.
is potentially useful for examining other issues related to outsourcing. For example, in our analysis, firms are identical in the extent to which they face a union monopoly. A natural extension is to allow firms to differ in this dimension. We have done some preliminary analysis of what happens when some firms are union and others nonunion and can show that if nonunion firms ever specialize, they do the labor-intensive task. We could use the structure to look at how changes in the extent of unionism impact the degree of outsourcing and also how outsourcing feeds back and impacts the incentive to organize unions. As another application, we can put this structure in an international context, and study how exposure to international trade impacts the incentive for domestic outsourcing. We expect interesting effects to emerge here because wages impact the incentive for domestic outsourcing ( Figure   1 ) and trade impacts wages.
A.1 Background Calculations for Section 3
We begin by deriving the integrated firm's labor demand. The cost function can be written as
Now if the firm produces  of each input, it obtains final good production of
So the firm's problem is
The FONC is
( 3 2 ) We can plug this into the firm's labor demand to obtain the demand faced by the labor union:
We use (29) to substitute in for    in the third line. The term  in the fourth line is a multiplicative constant independent of .
Thus, the labor union facing a vertically integrated firm sets  to maximize:
Straightforward manipulations of the FONC of problem (33) yields
where to simplify notation, we set  1 =  and  2 = 1 − . In the limiting case of  = 1, we can solve for the optimal union wage    as
We next look at costs at the limit under specialization. Using  2 = 1 − , and equation (15) for the optimal union wage, we can solve for the limiting cost of an intermediate 2 specialist as
where the last line follows from straightforward limit analysis. For an intermediate 1 specialist, using (21), we have
Next we prove Lemma A1 used in Proposition 1.
Proof. We can rescale things so that  +  = 1 and show the results holds for  = 1.
Straightforward manipulation of (34) shows that it holds if ()  0 for  ∈ [0 1 2
). Now it is easy to verify that (
). We prove this in separate notes. ¥ Finally, we prove the claims made in Section 3 about the shape of the function in the limit where  1 = 1,  2 = 0. From (26), we can write aŝ
Substituting in the limiting values for    ,  1 and  2 from above, we havê
Straightforward differentiation shows that the minimum of this function is obtained at a level
and that ( • ) is strictly decreasing or increasing as
A.2 Proofs of Results in Section 4
Lemma 2 
Proof.
We begin by calculating the production labor demand
In the limit where  1 = 1 and  2 = 0, prices equal
where we use (25) and we substitute in  1 and  2 from above. Now in the limit, labor demand simply equals composite input,  1 =  1 . Using formula (12) for the optimal choice of  1 and substituting in the optimal union wage  1 =  •  at the limit, we have
for  1 given above.
Next we determine the share of firms  1 choosing to be intermediate 1 specialists. From
Using the optimal choice of   from (12), we have
Now given fixed proportions,
Thus
( 3 8 ) Combining (36), (37), and (38) yields
The union rent is
Total labor demand equals
Thus total demand 
Now by definition of market clearing  =
Taking the formula (39) for •  to the (1 − ) power and canceling terms yields
Dividing both sides of (42) by (1 −   ) and using (43) to substitute in for
on the left-hand side and (41) to substitute in for (1 −   ) on the right-hand side, it follows that we need to show
or equivalently, that
is strictly decreasing in  • which is immediate. This proves (iii). ¥
As background for the proof of the next Lemma, we derive demand and rents for the only-integration case in the limiting case. Using (32), that
, that    =    in the limiting case, and that 
This is strictly decreasing in
Proof. Using the formulas (37) for  1 and (44) for    (and keeping in mind that 
On the curve,  1 =    . Hence, using (23) and (24), and substituting in
Recalling that
, substituting in for  1 from (38) and using
Using (45) 
We use straightforward calculations to show this is true for  
that strictly increases in  .
Note that by the definition of 
Hence for  ∈ (  ), a unique    ∈ (0 1) solves the equation (47) as claimed. For a given  0 ∈ (  ), let  0   be the share solving (47). Consider a higher  00   0 , but still  00  . We note first that
i.e. holding the   share fixed, but increasing  along that curve, lowers demand. To show this, note that with Case 1 we are on the upward-sloping portion of the curve
• and  , and since For all these points, firms strictly prefer specialization over integration and we have labor-market clearing, so each pair (  • *  ( )) is equilibrium with    = 0. This is the type  equilibrium.
To construct the other two equilibria, we need to consider three different subcases.
The first subcase is 
Note that for all such  , all the points on  Using (7), we can write rents divided by production workers as:
Note that in constructing the equilibrium, we are taking a convex combination of the equilibria of the only-specialization and only-integration regimes. For each extreme case the return to rent-seeking is  • and so this is also the return to rent-seeking in the convex combination.
To simplify, we express  We also simplify using  1 = 
• . This yields
Inspection of the bottom line shows that this strictly increases in 
• for fixed    . Furthermore, it strictly increases in    for fixed  • . In case 1,    and  • both strictly increase with  in the partial integration region, so  • also strictly increases with  . In case 2, in the region of multiple equilibria, for fixed  , equilibria with higher    have higher  • and thus higher  • . ¥
Proof of Proposition 4.
Using (40) and (46), we can write production worker demand from the  case as a function of the analogous demand in the   case, 
